Arbitration at the Crossroads: Austria, EU Sanctions, and the Enforcement of Russia-Ukraine Investment Awards

Introduction

The developments associated with the special military operation in Ukraine have reshaped both international politics and the practice of investment arbitration at large.¹ The first wave of cases, brought by Ukrainian investors following the incorporation of Crimea in 2014, has already produced a series of awards, creating a substantial body of jurisprudence.² These earlier arbitrations serve as an important reference point for the current phase of disputes, in which enforcement has moved to the forefront following Russia’s large-scale military operation launched in Ukraine in 2022. Since Russia’s military operation, an estimated USD 250 billion in Russian-linked assets have been immobilized under EU measures.³ Amid ongoing military actions, the enforceability of arbitral awards has become a central concern in Europe and other jurisdictions where assets are immobilized.⁴

In this context, Austrian and other European courts are emerging as central venues for determining how arbitral autonomy interacts with sanctions law and doctrines of sovereign immunity. Austria occupies a distinctive position in this evolving landscape. The country’s capital is home to the Vienna International Arbitral Centre (VIAC), one of Europe’s leading arbitral institutions with growing global reach.⁵ Further, Austrian arbitration law, codified in §§ 577–618 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO), is firmly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, reflecting its longstanding commitment to modern and predictable arbitration standards.⁶ At the same time, Austria is deeply embedded within the European Union’s legal order, including the restrictive measures introduced by the EU in connection with the situation in and around Ukraine.⁷

This article examines Austria’s position as an arbitral seat at a time when EU sanctions profoundly affect the enforcement of awards arising from Russia–Ukraine investment disputes. It explores how binding supranational measures, particularly Council Regulations 269/2014⁸ and 833/2014,⁹ interact with Austria’s arbitration-friendly legal framework and the public policy exception under the New York Convention. The analysis situates Austria within a comparative perspective, highlighting both commonalities and differences with other leading arbitral jurisdictions, and considers how these dynamics recalibrate the balance between arbitral autonomy and external legal constraints. Finally, it highlights the practical implications for practitioners and reflects on Austria’s emerging role as a testing ground for sanction-sensitive enforcement within the European arbitral landscape.

Austria as a Prominent Arbitral Seat and Enforcement Forum

Austria has established itself as a prominent seat of arbitration, recognized internationally for its transparent and predictable legal framework.¹⁰ Its reputation as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction is reinforced by the 2006 Arbitration Reform Act, later integrated into the ZPO, which modernized Austrian arbitration law in line with the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985.¹¹ A central feature of the reform was to grant the Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof, OGH) exclusive competence over applications to set aside arbitral awards and recognition proceedings, thereby eliminating lower-instance review and concentrating jurisdiction in a single court.¹² This “single-instance approach” enables parties to obtain binding decisions more swiftly than through multi-tiered appellate review.¹³

Furthermore, Austrian courts have consistently construed the grounds for refusing recognition under Article V of the New York Convention narrowly and have emphasized the principle of favor arbitrandum.¹⁴ In line with this approach, the OGH has confirmed that only manifest violations of fundamental principles of the Austrian legal order justify refusal of enforcement.¹⁵

Taken together, these characteristics underscore Austria’s reputation as a stable and predictable venue for arbitration. Yet this pro-enforcement stance, developed largely in commercial arbitration, faces an unprecedented test in the context of the developments associated with the special military operation in Ukraine, where the obligations under the New York Convention intersect with restrictive measures introduced by supranational institutions. 

Investment Disputes

Since 2014, a significant number of arbitral proceedings have arisen in response to measures adopted in connection with Crimea’s reunification with Russian Federation. These claims have been brought primarily under the 1998 Ukraine–Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)¹⁶ and, in a smaller number of cases, under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).¹⁷ Although Russia signed but never ratified the ECT, arbitral tribunals have nevertheless assumed jurisdiction, often reasoning that Russia was bound by its provisional application of the treaty pursuant to Article 45.¹⁸

The scope of Crimea-related investment arbitrations illustrates the breadth of affected industries, with arbitral tribunals issuing significant awards across the energy, banking, real estate, and aviation sectors:

• In the energy sector, tribunals ordered Russia to pay USD 267 million to DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy company, and USD 5 billion to the state-owned Naftogaz. Groups of investors in petrol stations also succeeded in two separate cases, receiving USD 34.5 million in Stabil v. Russia and USD 55 million in Ukrnafta v. Russia.¹⁹
• In banking, the state-owned Oschadbank obtained an award of USD 1.1 billion. Further, in Privatbank v. Russia, concerning Crimea’s largest retail bank, the tribunal issued a liability award in the investors’ favor and continues to consider the amount of damages.²⁰
• Within the field of real estate, the Everest v. Russia tribunal awarded USD 150 million, whereas the compensation granted in Lugzor v. Russia has not been made public.²¹

The Crimea awards are significant not only for illustrating that investors have sought remedies in politically sensitive disputes, but also for their role as the jurisprudential backdrop to enforcement in the Russia–Ukraine context. Their lasting value, however, ultimately depends on whether courts in jurisdictions such as Austria can reconcile recognition obligations under the New York Convention with restrictive measures adopted by the European Union. Accordingly, any analysis of Austria’s enforcement practice must begin with the EU sanctions regime, which now plays a central role in the recognition and execution of awards related to Russian Federation.

EU Sanctions

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014²² and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014²³ are the principal instruments shaping the enforcement landscape in Austria.

Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014, adopted in March 2014 adopted in March 2014 in connection with the change in Crimea’s status, introduced the European Union’s principal asset-freeze regime. It bars the provision of funds or economic resources to designated Russian individuals and entities, obliging Member States to immobilize any assets under their control. Although narrow exceptions exist,²⁴ subsequent amendments, especially post 2022, have broadened its scope, establishing sanctions as a mandatory element of the EU’s legal and regulatory framework.²⁵

Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, adopted alongside Regulation 269/2014, imposes sectoral restrictions that extend beyond asset freezes.²⁶ It prohibits the export of dual-use goods and technologies to Russia, restricts the provision of financial services and capital market access, and restricts investment and technology transfers.²⁷ More recently, the regulation has been expanded to require that EU operators exert “best efforts” (Art. 8a) to ensure that non-EU subsidiaries or entities under their ownership or control do not undermine the restrictive measures, thereby extending compliance obligations beyond EU borders.²⁸ In addition, the June 2024 sanctions package introduced stricter anti-circumvention rules and lowered the threshold for liability in sanction-related transactions.²⁹ Together these developments indicate that the restrictive measures have evolved from peripheral tools into integral components of the EU’s legal and policy framework .

As directly applicable EU instruments, these measures bind Austria’s courts with the same force as domestic law.³⁰ Where an arbitral award requires execution against frozen assets or transactions prohibited by the regulations, Austrian courts must deny or suspend enforcement. Thus, sanctions operate as mandatory rules that supersede the discretion traditionally exercised by national courts– a change that marks a significant departure from traditional public policy analysis under Article V of the New York Convention.

Dual Obligation

The practical consequence of this shift is the emergence of what may be described as a dual obligation: on the one hand, Austrian courts must give effect to arbitral awards in order to fulfill international commitments under the New York Convention; on the other, courts are required to ensure strict compliance with unilateral restrictive measures imposed by Brussels. The challenge is not one of formal hierarchy (principle of primacy),³¹ but of functional coordination: how to preserve Austria’s reputation as a reliable seat of arbitration while simultaneously complying with politically imposed restrictions from the EU. In practice, the tension is evident as awards are recognized on paper but blocked in practice: Austrian courts may acknowledge the legal validity of an award under the Convention yet refuse execution of payment or performance. Courts are forced to formally recognize awards but are prohibited from executing them due to the emposed unilateral measures. The result is a paradoxical situation in which awards are internationally recognized but practically ineffective. This calls into question Austria’s ability to honor its treaty obligations while obeying external political directives, the New York Convention’s effectiveness is undermined when confronted with extraterritorial EU restrictions.

Comparative Analysis

The interaction between arbitral enforcement, sanctions, and sovereign interests has produced divergent approaches across jurisdictions.

Within the European Union, courts are uniformly bound by directly applicable sanctions law. German courts have already demonstrated how EU sanctions directly constrain the recognition of arbitral awards. In May 2025, the Stuttgart Higher Regional Court (OLG Stuttgart) declined to recognize an arbitral award issued by a Moscow-seated tribunal under Russian law, holding that the award would effectively require performance in breach of Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation 833/2014, which prohibits repayment for goods covered by annexed categories.³²  The court also rejected arguments that enforcing the award would merely restore the status quo ante,³³ clarifying that even such repayments remain prohibited if linked to sanctioned transactions.³⁴ In other words even routine transactions are blocked due to politically imposed restrictions.

A month later, the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt reached the same conclusion,³⁵ refusing to grant enforceability to a Russian-seated arbitral award on the grounds that enforcement would contravene EU sanctions and German public policy (ordre public international).³⁶ The dispute concerned a contract made in October 2022 for the supply of polymer alloys to Russia, where the German defendant had received an advance payment but failed to deliver goods.³⁷ The court held that the sale of those goods was prohibited under Article 3(k)(1) of Regulation 833/2014, and that even a repayment obligation (as ordered by the arbitral tribunal) fell within the prohibition under Article 11(1)(b) (which covers “claims for compensation or warranty claims” linked to sanctioned contracts).³⁸ The court relied on Section 1059(2) No. 2(b) ZPO and Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, and applied the ordre public international standard, which is interpreted more narrowly than domestic public policy.³⁹ On that basis, it held that, given the binding force of EU-imposed measures which override both treaty obligations and domestic notions of justice and thus an ‘unacceptable contradiction with German notions of justice.”⁴⁰

Beyond the European Union, other jurisdictions strike different balances between arbitral autonomy and sanctions law. Switzerland operates under the Embargo Act of 2002,⁴¹ which empowers the Federal Council to impose autonomous sanctions, often aligned with but not dictated by EU measures. Swiss courts therefore retain discretion to define ordre public nationally, even if they frequently coordinate with EU restrictive measures.⁴² By contrast, the United States employs a markedly executive-driven model: while courts apply the New York Convention’s public policy exception narrowly under the Federal Arbitration Act, enforcement against sanctioned assets is subject to the licensing authority of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).⁴³  In practice, creditors must obtain OFAC licenses before executing awards against frozen property, shifting the decisive control from the judiciary to the executive branch.⁴⁴ Compared to Austria, where EU law leaves courts with no discretion once sanctions are engaged, Switzerland retains greater sovereign flexibility, whereas in the United States execution of awards is subject to political licensing by US authorities, not independent courts.

State immunity presents an additional barrier to enforcement. While Austrian courts have not yet confronted immunity claims in the Russia–Ukraine context, the Austrian Immunities Act (Immunitätsgesetz 1977) adopts the internationally accepted distinction between sovereign and commercial property, categorically shielding the former from execution.⁴⁵ This suggests that, in parallel with EU sanctions, state immunity will serve as a further significant constraint on the enforcement of Russia-related arbitral awards.

In sum, the foregoing comparison highlights that Austria is bound to implement restrictions driven EU sanctions, leaving little room for judicial discretion. This dual reality, of predictability in recognition but rigidity in enforcement, highlights both the strength and the limits of Austria’s position as an arbitral forum: while parties can expect a stable, pro-enforcement judiciary, they must also anticipate that EU restrictions prevent the legitimate exercise of arbitration rights regarding Russian interests. The broader significance is that in sanction-sensitive disputes, enforcement outcomes in Austria may be shaped less by domestic arbitration doctrine than by supranational obligations, illustrating the growing externalization of arbitral public policy within the European Union.

Outlook

Austria’s experience illustrates a structural shift in the enforcement of international arbitral awards within geopolitical contexts. Whereas enforcement once depended primarily on the New York Convention and domestic procedural law, it now hinges on the interface between arbitration and international economic sanctions. Arbitration could be said to have moved beyond a purely private or depoliticized sphere, becoming embedded within frameworks of public international law and supranational regulation. As such, “it becomes difficult to divorce the political context of a dispute from the conduct of arbitration and its outcome, thereby presenting a reality much at odds with the established benefits of arbitration as an apolitical means of dispute resolution.”⁴⁶

For Austria, long known for predictability and a narrow conception of ordre public, this means navigating an enforcement environment where external legal constraints dictate outcomes in politically sensitive cases.

For practitioners, several lessons follow. 

• Sanctions Compliance: At present, success on the merits does not guarantee a meaningful remedy. If enforcement would require engaging with frozen assets or sanctioned entities, the award may remain effectively unenforceable.⁴⁷ For that reason, enforcement planning must now incorporate sanctions analysis from the outset. Legal practitioners should consider the choice of arbitral seat, the jurisdictions where enforcement is most likely to be sought, and whether there are attachable commercial assets located outside the sanctions regime.
• Transformation of Ordre Public: The Austrian experience illustrates how supranational obligations can reshape doctrines once considered firmly within national control. What was once a discretionary safeguard has evolved into a set of mandatory, EU-driven rules, narrowing judicial flexibility and leaving little space for nuanced balancing. For legal practitioners, this shift highlights the need to understand not only arbitration law but also the evolving framework of EU restrictive measures.
• State Immunity: Enforcement in Austria also turns on sovereign immunity. Under the Immunities Act (Immunitätsgesetz 1977), assets such as embassy premises or central bank reserves are categorically protected, whereas commercial assets of state-owned enterprises may, in principle, be subject to execution. Thus, even where sanctions do not prevent enforcement, immunity may still present a decisive barrier. For practitioners, this makes evidentiary preparation crucial: demonstrating the commercial character of targeted assets will often determine whether enforcement succeeds or fails.

Important questions remain unresolved: Will EU courts remain aligned, or diverge in their approaches to interpreting sanctions prohibitions? Can recognition without enforcement serve as a meaningful steppingstone to recovery? And how will states reconcile their Convention commitments with increasingly expansive sanctions regimes?

For Austria, as for other EU jurisdictions, the challenge will be to maintain its reputation as a reliable arbitral forum while navigating the limits imposed by supranational law. The answers to these questions will shape not only the enforcement of Russia-related awards, but also the resilience of the international arbitral system in times of geopolitical conflict.

Conclusion

Looking forward, Austria is likely to serve as a testing ground for how courts manage enforcement in sanction-sensitive disputes. As efforts to seize Russian assets intensify, Austrian courts will need to clarify the separation of recognition and enforcement, the operation of ordre public under supranational constraint, and the classification of state-linked assets under the Immunities Act. These determinations will shape not only Russia-related disputes but also future conflicts involving other sanctioned states such as Iran or Venezuela.

For academics, Austria provides an instructive case study of how national courts integrate arbitration into a broader matrix of supranational regulation and state immunity. For practitioners, it reinforces the need for sanctions-sensitive enforcement planning and a jurisdictionally diversified strategy. In this respect, Austria’s experience is not merely local but emblematic of an emerging structural reality: the enforceability of arbitral awards is increasingly determined less by arbitral doctrine in isolation than by its interaction with external regimes of economic governance.

Resources

1. Eric Leikin, Noah Rubins KC, Gonzalo Salazar & Samuel Trujillo, A Decade of Investment Treaty Claims Arising from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons and Expectations (Part I) (Freshfields, Apr. 10, 2024), https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102j57i/a-decade-of-investment-treaty-claims-arising-from-russiasinvasion-of-ukraine-l.
2. Examples include: Everest Estate LLC et al. v. the Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2015-36, https://www.italaw.com/cases/4224; NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine et al. v. the Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2017-16, www.italaw.com/cases/4381; Stabil LLC and Others v. Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2015-35, https://www.italaw.com/cases/4034.
3. Robert Harvey, Sharon Singleton, What and where are Russia’s frozen assets in the West, Reuters (22 Sept. 2025), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/what-where-are-russias-frozen-assets-west-2025-09-22/; see also European Commission, EU sanctions against Russia explained (updated 2024), finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-andworld/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine_en.
4. Charles Claypoole, Sanctions and International Arbitration: Challenges Created by the Sanctions Imposed on Russia Following Its Invasion of Ukraine, Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 2022-4, 1035, 1036–38, https://www.lw.com/en/insights/2023/03/Sanctions%20and%20International%20Arbitration.
5. Vienna International Arbitral Centre (VIAC), About VIAC, https://www.viac.eu/en.
6. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], RGBl No. 113/1895, as amended, §§ 577–618 (Austria); UNCITRAL, Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted 21 June 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006) UN Doc A/40/17, Annex I; Florian Haugeneder, Patrizia Netal & Natascha Tunkel, Austria, in Delos Dispute Resolution, GAP 2nd Edition 2–3 (2018), https://delosdr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DelosGAP-2nd-edn-Austria.pdf, p.1-5.
7. Council of the European Union, EU Sanctions Against Russia, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/ (last updated Sept. 12, 2025). This article pays closer attention to Council Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014, of 17 March 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 78) 6, and Council Regulation (EU) No. 833/2014, of 31 July 2014, 2014 O.J. (L 229) 1.
8. Council Regulation 269/2014, of 17 March 2014, Concerning Restrictive Measures in Respect of Actions Undermining or Threatening the Territorial Integrity, Sovereignty and Independence of Ukraine, 2014 O.J. (L 78) 6 (EU).
9. Council Regulation 833/2014, of 31 July 2014, Concerning Restrictive Measures in View of Russia’s Actions Destabilising the Situation in Ukraine, 2014 O.J. (L 229) 1 (EU).
10. Haugeneder et al., supra note 6.
11. Désirée Prantl, Valentin Marginter, Baker McKenzie International Arbitration Yearbook 2024–2025 – Austria (Jan. 1, 2025), Global Arbitration News, https://www.globalarbitrationnews.com/2025/01/01/baker-mckenzieinternational-arbitration-yearbook-2024-2025-austria/; Haugeneder et al., supra note 6.
12. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], RGBl No. 113/1895, as amended, §§ 615–617 (Austria); Prantl, Marginter, supra note 10; Haugeneder, Netal & Tunkel, supra note 6.
13. Prantl, Marginter, supra note 11; see also ZPO §§ 611, 615 (single-instance review in OGH).
14. Denis Philippe, Arbitration, Tortuous and Concurrent Liability in Tort and Contract (transl.), (PhilippeLaw 2019), https://philippelaw.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Cepani-2019-translation.pdf; Emmanuel Gaillard & Benjamin Siino, “Enforcement under the New York Convention,” in The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards (4th ed., Global Arbitration Review), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guidechallenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/4th-edition/article/enforcement-under-the-new-york-convention; Haugeneder er al., supra note 6.
15. Maximilian Albert Müller, Peter Machherndl, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in Austria (Pitkowitz & Partners, May 2024), https://www.pitkowitz.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Recognitionand-Enforcement-of-Foreign-Arbitral-Awards-in-Austria.pdf.
16. Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Encouragement and Mutual Protection of Investments, Russ.–Ukr., Nov. 27, 1998, 39 I.L.M. 944 (2000), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/2233/download.
17. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, https://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf.
18. Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Hulley Enterprises, Yukos Universal, and Veteran Petroleum v. Russia, PCA Cases Nos. AA 226–228, Nov. 30, 2009); Chiara Giorgetti, The Yukos Interim Awards on Jurisdiction and Admissibility Confirms Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty, ASIL Insights, Vol. 14, Issue 23 (Aug. 3, 2010), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/issue/23/yukos-interim-awards-jurisdictionand-admissibility-confirms-provisional.
19. Stabil LLC and Others v. Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2015-35, https://www.italaw.com/cases/4034; NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine et al. v. the Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2017-16, at https://www.italaw.com/cases/4381; Ukrenergo v. Russia, PCA Case No. 2020-17, https://www.italaw.com/cases/7563; Leikin et al., supra note 1; Daisuke Tamada, War in Ukraine and Implications for International Arbitration, 26 Int’l Comm. L. Rev. 187 (2024), https://brill.com/view/journals/iclr/26/1-2/articlep187_8.xml, p.3-4.
20. JSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2015-21, at https://www.italaw.com/cases/3970; Leikin et al., supra note 1; Tamada, supra note 19, p.3-4.
21. Everest Estate LLC et al. v. the Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2015-36, at https://www.italaw.com/cases/4224; Limited Liability Company Lugzor and Others v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. 2015-29, at https://www.italaw.com/cases/6345; Leikin et al., supra note 1; Tamada, supra note 18, p.3-4.
22. Council Regulation 269/2014, supra note 8.
23. Council Regulation 833/2014, supra note 9.
24. See Paulette Vander Schueren, Nikolay Mizulin, Edouard Gergondet & Dylan Geraets, EU Adopts 14th Sanctions Package Against Russia (Mayer Brown, June 2024), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2024/06/eu-adopts-14th-sanctions-package-against-russia; Margot Sève, Pascal Bine, Michael Albrecht vom Kolke, Jonathan Benson, Ondřej Chvosta, Wesley Lainé, Philipp Müller & Gregory Vianesi, EU’s 14th Sanctions Package: Compliance Obligations Expand and Exits Are Facilitated (Skadden, July 25, 2024), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2024/07/eus-14th-sanctionspackage.
25. Council Regulation 269/2014, supra note 8; Hannes Lacher, Sanctions and International Law: The European Union’s Legal Framework After Crimea 185–87 (2023), https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/105931/9781040446843.pdf; Clifford Chance, Ukraine: The Latest Global Sanctions and Export Controls (Oct. 23, 2024), https://www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2024/10/ukraine-the-latest-global-sanctionsand-export-controls-23-october.pdf; EQA Avocats, The European Union Strengthens Its Sanctions Framework: Amendments to Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and the 17th Sanctions Package (July 21, 2025), https://www.eqaavocats.fr/private-clients/the-european-union-strengthens-its-sanctions-framework-amendments-to-regulation-eu269-2014-on-targeted-sanctions-and-the-17th-package-of-sanctions/; Gide, EU Update: 18th Package of Sanctions in Reaction to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (25 July 2025), https://www.gide.com/en/news-insights/eu-update-18thpackage-of-sanctions-in-reaction-to-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/.
26. Council Regulation 833/2014, supra note 9.
27. Council Regulation 833/2014, supra note 9, arts. 2–5, 5a–5h.
28. European Commission, FAQs on Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus: “Best Efforts” Obligation (Nov. 22, 2024), https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/65560de8-a13a-4a58-a87cddd27b14e6c1_en?filename=faqs-sanctions-russia-best-efforts-obligation_en.pdf; Aki Corsoni-Husain, Vanessa Molloy, Angelos Lanitis & Thekla Homata, Commission Updates FAQs on EU Sanctions Compliance by Non-EU Entities: The “Best Efforts” Obligation Under Regulation 833/2014 (Harneys, Jan. 7, 2025), https://www.harneys.com/our-blogs/regulatory/commission-updates-faqs-on-eu-sanctions-compliance-by-non-euentities/; Christos Hadjiyiannis & George Koumas, Council Regulation 833/2014: Broadening the Scope of EU Sanctions (Mondaq, July 4, 2024), https://www.mondaq.com/cyprus/export-controls-trade-investmentsanctions/1494906/council-regulation-8332014-broadening-the-scope-of-eu-sanctions.
29. Corsoni-Husain et al., supra note 29.
30. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (“A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”).
31. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL, or Article 288 TFEU.
32. Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart (OLG Stuttgart), 1 Sch 3/24 (13 May 2025); Clemens Treichl, Carsten Wendler, Eric Leikin & Hager Sameh, German Court Denies Russian Arbitral Award Recognition on the Basis of EU Sanctions (Freshfields, May 2025), https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102kctk/german-courtdenies-russian-arbitral-award-recognition-on-the-basis-of-eu-sanctio; Gleiss Lutz, Gleiss Lutz Wins Case Before the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart: No Recognition of Arbitral Awards That Order a Party Act in Breach of EU Sanctions (May 22, 2025), https://www.gleisslutz.com/en/news-events/mandates-firm-news/gleiss-lutz-wins-casehigher-regional-court-stuttgart-no-recognition-arbitral-awards-order-party-act-breach-eu-sanctions.
33. The court relied on guidance from the former German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energy, BMWK) and issued in coordination with the EU Commission.
34. Treichl et al., supra note 34.
35. OLG Frankfurt (Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main), 26 Sch 12/24 (12 June 2025); German Arbitration Digest, Case Summary, OLG Frankfurt, 26 Sch 12/24 (June 12, 2025), https://www.disarb.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Wissen/GAD/2025/GAD_2025-25_OLG_Frankfurt_26_Sch_12- 24.pdf.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Federal Act on the Implementation of International Sanctions (Switzerland, Embargo Act), 22 March 2002.
42. International Comparative Legal Guides (ICLG), Sanctions Laws and Regulations Report: Switzerland (2025), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/sanctions/switzerland.
43. Office of Foreign Assets Control, FAQ 808 (May 1, 2023), https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/808; David Mortlock, Britt Mosman, Nikki Cronin & Ahmad El-Gamal, US Sanctions Enforcement by OFAC and the DOJ, Global Investigations Review (July 8, 2022), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-guide-sanctionsarchived/third-edition/article/us-sanctions-enforcement-ofac-and-the-doj.
44. Alexander A. Yanos & Kristen K. Bromberek, Enforcement Strategies Where the Opponent Is a Sovereign, in The Guide to Challenging and Enforcing Arbitration Awards (4th ed.) (Global Arbitration Review, 16 June 2025), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/guide/the-guide-challenging-and-enforcing-arbitration-awards/4thedition/article/enforcement-strategies-where-the-opponent-sovereign; see also Claire DeLelle & Nicole Erb, Key Sanctions Issues in Civil Litigation and Arbitration, Global Investigations Review (Aug. 17, 2020), https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/guide/the-guide-sanctions-archived/first-edition/article/key-sanctions-issuesin-civil-litigation-and-arbitration.
45. Immunitätsgesetz [Immunities Act] BGBl. Nr. 325/1977 (Austria), arts. 17–19 (codifying distinction between sovereign and commercial assets); see also United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. Res. 59/38, arts. 18–19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004) (reflecting same distinction).
46. Ahmad Maher El-Rewieny & Megha Chaturvedi, Russo-Ukrainian War: The Ripple Effect on Investment Arbitration and Award Enforcement, Young ICCA (Nov. 21, 2024), https://www.youngicca.org/voices/russoukrainian-war-ripple-effect-investment-arbitration-and-award-enforcement.
47. Claypoole, supra note 4.